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• This article provides an overview of the
considerable body of research done in recent
years on policy rules. These are rules aimed
at guiding central banks as they deal with
the problem of how best to keep inﬂation
close to a desired path without creating
excess variability elsewhere in the economy.
• The authors describe the most popular types
of feedback rules—the Taylor rule and the
inﬂation-forecast-based rule—and review
some simulation results.
he success of industrial countries in reduc-
ing inﬂation, together with the adoption of
formal inﬂation-control targets by a growing
number of central banks, has generated con-
siderable interest in “feedback rules” for inﬂation tar-
geting. These rules link short-term interest rates
controlled by the central bank to the rate of inﬂation
and/or its deviation from the targeted rate. The last
few years have seen a sizable amount of research
devoted to assessing the performance of feedback
rules.
Rules cannot and should not be
followed mechanically by policy-
makers.
One should note at the outset that most contributors
to the literature on feedback rules seem to accept the
notion that rules cannot and should not be followed
mechanically by policy-makers. In this sense, policy
rules are seen as a guide around which discretion
should be used. Economists contributing to this
research assume that central banks have a target for
the inﬂation rate, whether explicit, as in Canada, or
implicit. One challenge for inﬂation targeting is that
while monetary policy affects the inﬂation rate with a
lag, the economy is constantly subjected to shocks, the
nature and duration of which are unknown when
policy is implemented. In this context, the studies
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examine how feedback rules for the policy instrument
may help keep inﬂation close to its target without
creating undue variability in other economic varia-
bles, especially output and interest rates.
The main questions addressed in the studies reviewed
relate to the kind of rule that a central bank should use
to guide its decisions. Should the rule be simple or
complex? Which variables, if any, should be included
in addition to the inﬂation rate? Should the central
bank act slowly or aggressively in response to these
variables? Should it respond to current information
only or to a forecast? One major issue is whether the
central bank is better off using an “optimal” rule
derived from its main model, or a “robust” rule that
provides reasonable results across a variety of models
or circumstances. Economists have attempted to
answer these questions by conducting historical stud-
ies, developing theoretical models and, most often, by
carrying out simulation studies using macroeconomic
models.
This article provides an overview of the recent litera-
ture on feedback rules. It is not meant to be a compre-
hensive survey of the numerous articles written on the
topic, but rather, the purpose is to give a general idea
of the major issues and ﬁndings. We begin with a dis-
cussion of how the literature interprets the problems
faced by central bankers and how policy rules are
offered as a solution. This is followed by a description
of the most popular types of feedback rules and a
review of some simulation results.
Analytical Framework
Policy objectives
To assess what type of rule is best suited to guide the
conduct of policy, one must develop criteria with
which to evaluate the rule’s performance. There is a
fairly broad consensus in the literature that a policy
rule should be judged on how close it keeps inﬂation
around its target, and how effectively it dampens ﬂuc-
tuations in output (or unemployment). The models
used in this literature assume that, in the long run,
monetary policy affects only the price level so that it
makes no sense for monetary policy to target the level
or growth rate of output or the level of unemploy-
ment.1 But in the short run, the assumption of market
imperfections (typically, sticky prices) implies that
monetary policy also affects real output. So, in the
short run, it is assumed that monetary policy should
1. It is, nevertheless, increasingly recognized that, in the real world, low inﬂa-
tion improves the functioning of the economy over time.
aim at stabilizing inﬂation around its long-run target
and output around its sustainable rate. This character-
ization of policy objectives appears consistent with the
way inﬂation-targeting countries currently operate
and with the view that the ultimate goal of monetary
policy is an economy with stable paths for both inﬂa-
tion and output.
In the short run, it is assumed that
monetary policy should aim at
stabilizing inﬂation around its long-
run target and output around its
sustainable rate.
Many studies also assume that interest rate stability is
an additional criterion that should be used to evaluate
the performance of alternative policy rules. Some
researchers include this criterion in recognition of the
fact that model relationships could break down if pol-
icy requires changes in interest rates that are outside
the range of historical experience. Mishkin (1999)
argues that interest rate smoothing should be consid-
ered for two reasons: (i) it helps maintain the central
bank’s reputation—reversing course frequently can
reduce conﬁdence in the central bank’s competence
and therefore reduce the credibility and effectiveness
of policy; and (ii) it reduces the risks of ﬁnancial insta-
bility since interest rate instability can be a source of
ﬁnancial fragility. Another argument, formalized by
Woodford (1999), is that by adopting a policy of mov-
ing interest rates gradually, in a series of small steps in
the same direction, the central bank provides clearer
signals to the market than if it was reversing course
frequently. By doing so, central bank actions have a
greater effect on long-term interest rates and therefore
on aggregate demand decisions.
Given the foregoing arguments, the policy-maker’s
preferences are often formalized in terms of a loss
function. The function identiﬁes which targets are
deemed important by the policy-makers and indicates
the relative weights attached to those variables. For
ease of solution, most studies specify a static loss func-
tion of the following type:
, (1) L ay t yt* – () ×
2
b Pt P* – ()
2




× ++ =45 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 1999–2000
where is the level of output in period t, is poten-
tial output,  is the inﬂation rate,  is the target
inﬂation rate, and  is the nominal interest rate.2 The
relative weights assigned to the various objectives (the
parameters a, b, and c) are positively related to the
costliness of these factors. Unfortunately, there is very
little theoretical analysis on this topic. For this reason,
most researchers experiment with alternative values
for the parameters in the loss function.3 The loss func-
tion is a highly simpliﬁed representation of the central
bank’s objectives. Notice that the deviations of the
variables from their “targets” are squared. This
implies that larger deviations are relatively more
costly than small deviations. The quadratic form also
implies that the central bank is equally averse to
misses on both sides of the targets under all circum-
stances.
From policy objective to policy rule
A policy rule is a formula linking the policy instru-
ment to speciﬁed economic conditions. In current cen-
tral bank practice, the instrument is usually a short-
term interest rate.4 In linear models, once the loss
function is speciﬁed, the optimal control problem can
be solved analytically to determine the optimal policy
rule. The optimal rule will be the rule that minimizes
the loss function under constraints describing the
structure of the economy, which are embodied in a
model.
Models can vary greatly in level of complexity and
detail but, typically, they reﬂect the following aspects
of the transmission mechanism. A change in interest
rates ﬁrst causes a change in aggregate demand and
then, later on, a change in inﬂation, since the latter
depends on the discrepancy between actual and
potential output (output gap). When the economy is
hit by a demand shock, the monetary authority’s
response will help stabilize both the output gap and
2.  In dynamic models, the monetary authority is viewed as minimizing the
discounted present value of the current and expected future losses.
3.  Svensson (1996) suggests that a central bank with limited experience with
inﬂation targeting may want to place a high weight on inﬂation relative to
other variables so that inﬂation targets are closely adhered to and credibility
is enhanced. McCallum (1993) and Poole (1999) argue that the performance of
rules should be judged primarily by the rate of inﬂation because the short-run
impact of policy on the real economy is uncertain. McCallum also notes that
the objective of actual policy appears to be dominated by a desire for output
(or employment) to be high and inﬂation to be low. Output above normal is
avoided not because it is itself considered undesirable, but because of the fear
that it will lead to increased inﬂation in the future.
4.  A notable exception is McCallum (1988) who proposed a simple rule link-




inﬂation, so that there is not really a trade-off between
inﬂation and output variability arising from these
shocks. Consider a reduction in consumption spend-
ing that causes output to fall below potential and
therefore leads to inﬂation falling below target. In
response to this negative demand shock, the central
bank lowers interest rates, which helps return both
inﬂation and output to their targeted levels. In con-
trast, if the economy gets hit by an inﬂation shock, the
monetary authority faces a short-run trade-off
between output and inﬂation variability. As an exam-
ple, consider an energy shortage that pushes inﬂation
above its target. To bring inﬂation back down, interest
rates must be increased. This will not immediately
lower inﬂation, however, but instead will ﬁrst cause
output to fall below potential. It is this negative out-
put gap that will reduce inﬂation. Trying to push inﬂa-
tion back to its target rapidly may result in large
variations in output around potential and, in extreme
cases, may lead to instrument instability.5 On the
other hand, trying to prevent output from moving sig-
niﬁcantly could lead to continuous and excessive
deviations of inﬂation from the target (Fuhrer 1997).
For a given model of the economy, one can trace a
curve like the AA curve shown in Chart 1, which can
5.  Because interest rates affect inﬂation with a lag, a change in interest rates
calculated to bring inﬂation back to target very quickly can conceivably push
inﬂation further off the other side of the target, requiring a larger change in
interest rates in the other direction. This can set off a seesaw pattern in inter-
est rates that becomes explosive.
Chart 1
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be thought of as a menu of output-price variability
choices for the authorities (a policy possibility fron-
tier). The shape and location of this curve are a function
of, among other things, the price-setting structure of
the economy, with more ﬂexible markets moving the
curve closer to the origin. Clearly, the best outcome for
the economy is at the origin, where inﬂation is always
on target and output is at potential. But in an economy
subject to shocks, this outcome is not feasible. The
curve AA is the minimum attainable combination of
inﬂation and output variability. A point like C is not
optimal because there are many points closer to the
origin with less variability in both output and inﬂa-
tion. However, once the curve AA is achieved, less
inﬂation variability can be achieved only at the cost of
higher output variability. The optimal policy is repre-
sented by the point of tangency (point D) between the
preferences of the authorities (the indifference curve
BB) and the possibility frontier.6
The variables in the optimal rule need not be the same
as those in the loss function. Typically, the optimal
rule will include more variables than appear in the
loss function since, in most circumstances, the optimal
rule depends on all the economic variables that affect
the target variables. The more complicated the model,
the more model-speciﬁc and complicated the optimal
rule will be. For example, in an open economy, foreign
variables or the exchange rate may enter the policy
rule because they affect the outcome for output and
inﬂation. The coefﬁcients in the optimal policy rule are
linked in a precise manner to the underlying structure
of the economy and to the weights the central bank
places on its various objectives.
As noted above, providing the model is not too com-
plex, the optimal rule can be derived analytically (see
the Box on page 48 for an example). Alternatively,
researchers have made increasing use of stochastic
simulations to ﬁnd an approximation of the optimal
rule. Stochastic simulations involve subjecting the
model to an array of random shocks similar to those
that have been observed over a historical period or
representative of those that are likely to prevail in the
future. This allows the distribution of target variables
under various rules or other model assumptions to be
calculated. The best rule is then determined as the one
that provides the best economic performance under
6.  The problem is more complex when the loss function includes more than
two objectives. For example, if the central bank has a three-fold objective
including interest rate stability, there will typically be a trade-off between the
variability of inﬂation, the variability of output, and the variability of interest
rates. Note also that the trade-off curves are not necessarily as smooth as rep-
resented in Chart 1.
speciﬁc assumptions about the weights in the loss
function.
Complications arising from uncertainty
The above analysis ignores the fact that when making
decisions on interest rates, policy-makers are con-
fronted with various sources of uncertainty. They are
uncertain about the current state of the economy
because information on many variables is available
only with a lag and is subject to revision. In addition,
some key concepts like potential output are measured
very imprecisely. Policy-makers are uncertain about
the nature and persistence of the shocks they currently
face or will face in the future. They are also uncertain
about the parameter values linking variables in their
model, including the effect of their own policy actions
(“long and variable” lags). More basically, they are
uncertain about the speciﬁcation of the economy (how
best to characterize the overall model).
In linear models with quadratic preferences, uncer-
tainty about the state of the economy and the shocks
(additive uncertainty) does not change optimal policy.
This result is referred to as “certainty-equivalence.”
Other sources of uncertainty, however, may lead to an
optimal policy response that is more muted than it
would be in a world of certainty. In a seminal article,
Brainard (1967) explains that the presence of uncer-
tainty about the interest sensitivity of the economy
will cause the policy-maker to move the policy instru-
ment by smaller magnitudes than would be the case
with certainty. However, little can be said about the
impact on optimal policy response if there is uncer-
tainty about all, or most, parameters in the model. In
general, Brainard-type parameter uncertainty induces
the policy-maker to attempt to minimize the devia-
tions in the variables to which the uncertain coefﬁcient
is attached.7 For example, uncertainty about the effect
of inﬂation surprises on future inﬂation would lead
the policy-maker to respond to inﬂation shocks more
sharply, not less, in order to minimize deviations of
7. This is because the larger the change in the variable concerned, the greater
the uncertainty about the effect of that variable on the economy (in other
words, the larger is the variance of outcomes). Parameter uncertainty intro-
duces a trade-off between setting the instrument to get as near as possible to
the desired value of the target variables and increasing the prospective vari-
ance of the target variables because of the uncertainty about the relationship
between the instrument and the target. Some have argued that in an intertem-
poral framework, it may be optimal for a monetary authority to experiment
because such experimentation reveals information about how the economy
works and speeds up the learning process. Wieland (1998) ﬁnds that the opti-
mal policy that balances the cautionary and activist motives is typically less
aggressive than a policy that ignores parameter uncertainty. There are excep-
tions, however, when the degree of uncertainty is very high and inﬂation is
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inﬂation from target.8 So, in this example, the policy
response would be more aggressive than in the cer-
tainty case.
To deal with model uncertainty, a number of econo-
mists, most notably McCallum (1988), have recom-
mended that policy-makers search for policy rules
that are robust, in the sense of yielding reasonably
desirable outcomes in policy simulation experiments
in a wide variety of models. At a recent conference on
policy rules, Sargent (1999) and Stock (1999) discussed
the results of some ongoing work on approaches to
robustness vis-à-vis model uncertainty. One approach
would be to use a linear combination of the optimal
policy rules (each one accounting for parameter
uncertainty) derived from competing models. How-
ever, Stock argues that these calculations require an
unrealistic amount of information. An alternative that
both promote is to evaluate policies by their worst-
case performance across the various models consid-
ered. The rationale here is that by planning against the
worst, the policy-maker assures acceptable performance
under a range of speciﬁcation errors. From this per-
spective, the best policy is the policy that has the low-
est maximum risk across models. A main conclusion
of their work is that caution induced by a preference
for robustness does not necessarily translate into
“doing less.”
Model uncertainty greatly complicates the problem of
ﬁnding a good monetary policy rule. Robustness
across models has generated considerable interest in
“simple” rules, that is, rules that include only a few
variables. The intuition here is that simple rules are
less likely to be model-speciﬁc than complicated rules.
It is also often argued that simple rules are more
advantageous for policy-makers because they are
more easily understood and therefore more conducive
to building and maintaining policy credibility. Obvi-
ously, this last argument does not carry as much
weight if policy-makers do not follow the rules very
closely.
The Most Popular Rules
Two types of rules have attracted a good deal of atten-
tion in recent empirical work: the Taylor rule, which is
by far the more popular, and the inﬂation-forecast-
based rule. This section brieﬂy describes these rules
and the rationale behind their construction.
8.  See Srour (1999) for a more detailed discussion of the various sources of
uncertainty and their effect on optimal policy.
The Taylor rule
Taylor (1993) proposed that the central bank should
adjust its real interest rate in response to three varia-
bles: the current value of the output gap, the current
deviation of inﬂation from its target (with inﬂation
being measured as a four-quarter rate of increase), and
a measure of the equilibrium (or “neutral”) real inter-
est rate (equation 2). Inﬂation and output are given
equal weights of 0.5:
. (2)
This rule indicates that when the economy is in equi-
librium, that is, when the inﬂation rate is equal to its
target rate and output is equal to potential, the real
interest rate is also at its equilibrium or “neutral”
value. If inﬂation is above target or output is above
potential, then real interest rates have to increase
above their neutral value to bring these variables back
to target. If, on the contrary, inﬂation or output are
below their targeted or equilibrium values, interest
rates have to decline to restore equilibrium.9
Taylor developed this rule after examining the results
of a major model-comparison project (Bryant et al.
1993).10 His objective was to ﬁnd a simple, easily
understandable rule that would capture the key
results from simulations of many different models.
The equation was not estimated, but the values of the
parameters and the equilibrium levels were chosen
such that the equation roughly described the actual
behaviour of the Federal Reserve during the (success-
ful) Greenspan period: 1987–92. The ﬁt of the equation
could have been improved by using a regression to
estimate the parameters of the rule, especially if one
included lagged variables and additional terms.11
However, Taylor notes that the equation was meant to
be a normative recommendation of what interest rates
should be, not a description of actual Fed behaviour. It
is, nevertheless, clear that enormous interest was gen-
erated by the close correlation between the Fed behav-
iour and the Taylor rule during a period where
monetary policy was judged to be very successful. The
rule also helps to explain why policy was not so suc-
cessful in other years because real interest rates did
not move appropriately. In particular, the research
9. This rule can also be written with the nominal interest rate on the left-hand
side as follows: , where i* = r* +.
10.  This discussion is based on Taylor (1998).
11. This has been demonstrated in a number of papers. Good examples of this
work include Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(1998).
rt r* 0.5 (Pt P*) 0.5 yt y* – () × + – × + =
it i* 1.5 Pt P* – () 0.5 yt y* – () × + × + = P*48 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 1999–2000
shows that it is crucial that the response of nominal
interest rates to an inﬂation shock be large enough to
ensure that real interest rates move in the right direc-
tion, preventing inﬂation from spinning out of control
following an inﬂation shock.12
12.  This conclusion is supported by historical studies that ﬁnd that the esti-
mated coefﬁcients on inﬂation are higher in countries that have had more
stable inﬂation over time (Wright 1997). Furthermore, estimates for the
United States show that the coefﬁcient on inﬂation seems to have increased
in the 1980s and 1990s compared with the previous two decades. This may
account for the improved economic performance in the latter period (see, for
example, Judd and Rudebusch 1998). Canada’s experience under monetary
targeting provides another example. Given that M1 has a high interest rate
elasticity, the increases in short-term interest rates that were sufﬁcient to keep
M1 inside target in the face of increased inﬂationary pressures were not large
enough to offset the impact of these price shocks (Thiessen 1983).
The Taylor rule has sometimes been criticized on the
grounds that, despite its apparent simplicity, the rule
is not all that easy to apply, because of uncertainty
regarding the estimates of potential output and the
equilibrium real interest rate. The results are also sus-
ceptible to data revisions.13 These are valid concerns,
but they would also apply to other policy approaches.
Another difﬁculty with the Taylor rule is that, since
monetary policy affects the economy with a lag, it
may not be appropriate to move interest rates only in
reaction to current values of inﬂation and output.
Nevertheless, under some very speciﬁc and simple
13.  For instance, Orphanides (1998) and Evans (1998) have found that the
performance of the Taylor rule in replicating history deteriorates when data
that were actually available to policy-makers are used, as opposed to the ﬁnal
revised data used by Taylor.
Deriving an Optimal Rule: A Simple Example
Following Svensson (1997), Ball (1997), and Srour
(1999), let us assume that the economy can be rep-




where  is the level of output j periods in the
future,  is potential output,  is the inﬂation
rate,  is the real interest rate.  and  are inde-
pendently and identically distributed random
shocks (and therefore expected to be zero on aver-
age), which are known to the monetary authority
only after the interest rate has been set in period t.
Equation (1) is a standard Phillips curve, and equa-
tion (2) is an IS curve. Notice that the interest rate
affects output only after one period and inﬂation
only after two periods (through the output gap).
Let us assume further that the monetary authority
tries to minimize a loss function, such as equation
(1) in the main text. To simplify the problem, set
and  to 0, which implies that the monetary
authority is concerned only about deviations of
inflation from target.1 Therefore, the optimal policy is
1.  If  is different than zero, one can still show that the optimal rule for this
model is a Taylor rule; however, the derivation becomes more complicated.
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to choose the interest rate such that expected inﬂa-
tion two periods ahead is on target and, there-
fore,  the target inﬂation rate.
(Remember that this is the earliest period over
which monetary policy has control over inﬂation.)
Substituting equation (2) into equation (1) results in
. (3)
Substituting equation (1) into equation (3) and set-
ting  gives
. (4)
Rearranging and combining terms generates an
equation for :
. (5)
In this simple case, the optimal control rule has the
form of a Taylor rule, with the coefﬁcients and
being a function of the model parameters , ,
and .
Et Pt 2 + () P * , =
Et Pt 2 + () Et Pt 1 + () lm yt y* – () × + =
lV rt r* – () × –
Et Pt 2 + () P * =
P* Pt l yt y* – () l m yt y* – () × + × + =
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model assumptions, Ball (1997) and Svensson (1997)
have shown that rules with the Taylor form can be
equivalent to a forward-looking inﬂation rule and can
correspond to the optimal rule.14 This is because in
their simple model, the current output gap and cur-
rent inﬂation are the optimal predictors of future inﬂa-
tion. The response to contemporaneous variables is
not aimed at stabilizing current output and inﬂation,
which would, in any case, be impossible, given the
lags in the model. See the Box on page 48 for details.
Ball (1999) and Svensson (1998a) show that the Taylor
rule may need to be modiﬁed for small open econo-
mies like Canada. Using an open-economy model
with adaptive expectations (that is, expectations
formed on the basis of past experience), Ball argues
that the exchange rate should be included in two
ways: ﬁrst, the monetary conditions index (MCI)
should replace the interest rate as the policy instru-
ment, and second, the inﬂation term should abstract
from temporary (i.e., price-level) exchange rate
effects.15 Ball’s argument is that exchange rate
changes tend to have temporary effects on inﬂation,
and attempts to offset these effects could cause undue
variability in output. Svensson (1998a), using a model
with forward-looking, model-consistent expectations
(that is, expectations that respond to information con-
tained in the model), also ﬁnds support for a similar
MCI rule.
Inﬂation-forecast-based rule
Rules based on inﬂation forecasts make the change in
the policy instrument a function of the deviation of a
conditional forecast of inﬂation in some future period
from the target rate of inﬂation, as follows:
. (3)
Haldane (1997) refers to the above rule as the generic
form of feedback rule under an inﬂation-targeting
regime since it captures the operational practice of
some inﬂation targeters. The conditional inﬂation
forecast serves as a feedback variable, and the devia-
tion between the feedback variable and the inﬂation
target dictates the necessary degree of instrument
14.  Note, however, that optimal rules typically have higher coefﬁcients than
Taylor’s setting of 0.5, 0.5.
15. The MCI is a weighted sum of interest rates and the exchange rate with the
weights based on the relative importance of the effect of the two variables on
aggregate demand.
rt a r × t 1 – g (Et Ptk + () P *) – × + =
adjustment.16 For several years, the Bank of Canada
has used a rule of this type in QPM, its projection
model of the economy. But in QPM, the left-hand-side
variable is the difference between the short- and long-
term interest rate (the term spread) instead of just the
short-term interest rate.
Batini and Haldane (1999) argue that Taylor-type rules
underplay the forward-looking aspect of policy. In
principle, there may not be much to choose between
the two types of rules, since forecasts are formed on
the basis of information available in the current
period. In practice, however, they see several advan-
tages in having interest rates respond directly and
explicitly to the inﬂation forecasts. First, it allows pol-
icy-makers to adjust the horizon of the inﬂation fore-
cast, depending on the length of the transmission lag
for monetary policy. Second, a judicious choice of the
forecasthorizon forinﬂationcan ensureproper output
stabilization. Finally, forecast-based rules may be
more efﬁcient than simple backward-looking rules
since the inﬂation forecast can use all relevant infor-
mation for predicting inﬂation.
There are potential difﬁculties with the inﬂation-fore-
cast-based rule. Although it appears to be as simple as
the Taylor rule because it includes only a few argu-
ments, it is implicitly more complex and more model-
speciﬁc. Furthermore, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999)
show that there is a risk of indeterminacy if a forecast-
based rule, rather than a rule based on actual inﬂation,
is used. Also, inﬂation-forecast-based rules do not
attempt to distinguish between demand shocks and
inﬂation shocks. The interest rate response depends
only on the forecasted deviation of inﬂation from its
target. Putting some weight on output, as in the Taylor
rule, allows the responses to differ.
Stabilization Properties of Simple
Rules: Some Simulation Results
A number of recent studies have examined how sim-
ple rules like those described above—or their vari-
ants—perform relative to the fully optimal rules
16.  The inﬂation-forecast-based rule described in this section should not
be confused with Svensson’s inﬂation-targeting rule (Svensson 1998b).
Svensson argues that the central bank should use an inﬂation forecast as
an explicit intermediate policy target. While the Taylor rule and the inﬂation-
forecast-based rule are simple feedback rules for the policy instrument,
Svensson’s approach requires that the central bank solve an optimal-control
problem in which it tries to minimize the deviations of its inﬂation forecast
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within a given model of the economy. Others have
compared the performance of alternative rules across
different models. Still others have examined how the
optimal calibration of the rule varies with the model
characteristics or with the presence of uncertainty. The
following is a brief overview of what the research to
date suggests.
Simple rules work well for closed
economies
Several studies that use data from large countries con-
clude that once the coefﬁcients have been judiciously
chosen, simple Taylor-type rules, perhaps augmented
with a lagged dependent variable, do remarkably
well—their performance at stabilizing the economy
almost matches the optimal rule in a given model.17
This suggests that there is no need to use a rule that is
too complicated. For instance, Levin, Wieland, and
Williams (1999) compare the performance of alterna-
tive rules in four large-scale, rational-expectations
models for the United States and ﬁnd that a Taylor
rule with a lagged interest rate provides very good
results. Increasing the rule complexity, by adding lags
and other variables in the model, yields very small
gains. Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) ﬁnd that a sim-
ple Taylor rule that includes only the current value of
inﬂation and the output gap performs nearly as well
as the optimal rule in a small adaptive-expectations
model of the U.S. economy.18
 In their model, Rudebusch and Svensson also ﬁnd
that model-consistent, inﬂation-forecast-based rules
perform poorly compared with Taylor-type rules. In
contrast, studies that examine smaller, more open
economies ﬁnd that inﬂation-forecast rules tend to
perform better than simple Taylor rules. Using a mod-
iﬁed version of the Bank of Canada’s QPM model,
Black, Macklem, and Rose (1998) conclude that the
inﬂation-forecast rule does better than Taylor-type
rules, especially with respect to minimizing interest
rate volatility. They ﬁnd that an eight-quarter lead
on annual inﬂation provides the best outcome if the
policy-maker is concerned about both output and
17.  Little can be concluded about the optimal size of the coefﬁcients in the
rule, since the results are model-speciﬁc. Nevertheless, a majority of studies
using sticky-price aggregate demand/aggregate supply models have found
that the coefﬁcients on inﬂation and on output should be larger than those
originally proposed by Taylor.
18.  For more evidence that a simple Taylor-type rule can achieve results
close to the optimal rule, see Peersman and Smets (1998), who use a model
estimated for ﬁve large European Union countries, and Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999) who use U.S. data.
inflation. Using a calibrated model of the U.K. economy,
Batini and Haldane (1999) also ﬁnd that an inﬂation-
forecast rule outperforms a Taylor-type rule. In their
model, a forecast horizon of four to six quarters for
quarterly inﬂation appears to do best.19 Furthermore,
they ﬁnd that an inﬂation-forecast rule comes close to
matching the optimal rule.
As noted by Levin, the fundamental mechanism
seems to be that forward-looking rules perform better
than rules based on current variables in an environ-
ment with temporary shocks to inﬂation. (See Taylor
1999a, 200.) In the United States, simple Taylor rules
work well because inﬂation is mainly domestically
generated and both output and inﬂation exhibit a high
degree of persistence. The Taylor rule exploits the pre-
dictive power of past inﬂation and output for future
inﬂation. In more open economies, inﬂation also
reﬂects external developments, particularly exchange
rate changes, which tend to have a high variance. In
this case, being able to ﬁlter temporary shocks from
more permanent ones by using an inﬂation-forecast
rule will likely lead to better outcomes.20
One alternative is to augment Taylor-type rules with
variables that help capture external inﬂuences. Ball
(1999) provides some evidence that, for a small open
economy, adding the exchange rate to a Taylor rule
improves the stabilization properties. In particular, he
ﬁnds that it signiﬁcantly reduces output variability for
a given amount of inﬂation variability. More studies
are required to establish the robustness of this result.
Private sector expectations are critical
The characteristics of efﬁcient policy rules depend
critically on assumptions regarding private sector
expectations. In Taylor rules augmented with a lagged
dependent variable, the higher the degree of forward-
lookingness, the lower would be the coefﬁcients on
inflation and output and the higher the coefficient
on the lagged interest rate. When policy adjusts
gradually to its desired position, forward-looking
market participants will expect a small initial policy
move to be followed by additional moves in the same
direction. If aggregate demand depends in a major
way on expected future short-term rates (or
19.  Using data for Australia, de Brouwer and O’Regan (1997) also ﬁnd that
rules using forecast values outperform those based only on current values.
20.  There is also some evidence that inﬂation-forecast-based rules perform
better than simple Taylor rules in non-linear models, as shown by Isard,
Laxton, and Eliasson (1999). According to Svensson (1999), this is because the
inﬂation-forecast rule is more complicated and provides a closer approxima-
tion to the true optimal rule (which is non-linear) in a non-linear model.51 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 1999–2000
equivalently, long-term rates) and not simply on current
short-term rates, then policy will have a substantial
impact on current output and inﬂation without requir-
ing large interest rate movements.21 In adaptive-
expectations models, expectations are not dependent
on the policy rule, and rules that imply very gradual
adjustments work poorly and may even lead to
instability.22
For the inﬂation-forecast-based rule, Batini and
Haldane (1999) show that the optimal time horizon
for responding to the deviations of forecast inﬂation
from its target is sensitive to the model’s lag struc-
ture, which in turn depends on private sector expecta-
tions. In general, the longer the transmission lag,
the further into the future is the optimal forecast
horizon. Behavioural shocks that lead to a shortening
of the transmission lag, such as increased credibility
in policy, must be accompanied by a shortening of the
policy horizon. If not, the performance of the economy
may actually worsen (Amano et al. 1999). When
shocks hit the economy, something must change to
dampen the resulting ﬂuctuations in output and inﬂa-
tion. If the private sector looks ahead and adjusts its
spending and price- and wage-setting in anticipation
of the central bank’s eventual response, the central
bank need not be as forward-looking.
Ryan and Thompson (1999) provide another example
in which expectations are important. Following Ball’s
argument that the measure of inﬂation should be
stripped of exchange rate effects, they compare the
performance of rules that use alternative deﬁnitions of
inﬂation, that is, aggregate inﬂation, non-tradable-
goods inﬂation, and unit labour costs. They ﬁnd that
using the latter two measures does not improve stabil-
ity and, in some cases, even worsens economic per-
formance. They attribute this result to the fact that in
their model, all exchange rate shocks feed into private
21. This argument was ﬁrst suggested by Goodfriend (1991). In a model with
purely forward-looking expectations, Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) ﬁnd
that the optimal coefﬁcient on lagged interest rates is larger than 1.
22. In theory, adaptive-expectations models may not be well suited for evalu-
ating the long-run properties of rules since the model parameters are implic-
itly assumed to be policy-invariant (Lucas critique). However, this problem
will not be too severe if the rules that are analyzed do not differ signiﬁcantly
from those experienced historically. Moreover, results obtained from these
models may also be relevant over short periods if the formation of expecta-
tions adjusts gradually to changes in policy. On the other hand, there is an
element of circularity in rational-expectations models since they assume that
the policy rule is fully credible and that the public has certain knowledge of
the model. But in practice there is much uncertainty, and probably a diversity
of views, about the model. Indeed, models of inﬂation have evolved over
time.
sector expectations. If policy does not aim to offset
these shocks, they propagate into continuing inﬂation.
Uncertainty can have a major effect
As discussed above, in theory it is not obvious how
uncertainty will affect optimal policy. A few studies
have attempted to quantify the impact of different
forms of uncertainty. To date, the results suggest that
data uncertainty as well as general forms of model
uncertainty can signiﬁcantly affect the efﬁcient feed-
back parameters in policy rules. Results concerning
the impact of simple Brainard-style parameter uncer-
tainty are mixed.
Peersman and Smets (1998), Rudebusch (1999), and
Orphanides (1998) ﬁnd that errors in measuring
potential output (and inﬂation in the latter two stud-
ies) lead to a marked reduction in the size of the  efﬁ-
cient parameters of simple rules if these errors are
large. (See also Isard et al. 1999.) In the ﬁrst two of
these, the authors conclude that parameter uncer-
tainty as deﬁned by Brainard reduces the efﬁcient
feedback parameters only marginally. A similar con-
clusion is reached by Estrella and Mishkin (1999). In
contrast, Sack (1998) and Martin and Salmon (1999)
ﬁnd that parameter uncertainty substantially damp-
ens the response of interest rates. Sack argues that
parameter uncertainty can account for the interest rate
smoothing that is found in historical estimates of
Taylor rules. The studies that ﬁnd little effect from
parameter uncertainty use small structural models,
while the other two use unrestricted vector autore-
gressions (VARS). According to Rudebusch, the large
effects found in the latter may reﬂect the additional
uncertainty associated with the wide standard errors
of some superﬂuous variables in the VARS.
There is some evidence that simple
rules are more robust across models
than more complicated rules.
Stock (1999), Sargent (1999), and Williams (1999) esti-
mate the impact of uncertainty using robust control
techniques. Sargent examines rules that are robust to
changes in the serial correlation structure of the
model, while Stock and Williams look for rules that52 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 1999–2000
are robust to different values of parameters in the
demand and price equations. Using small-scale, adap-
tive-expectations models, both Stock and Sargent ﬁnd
that, in order to guard against the worst-case scenario
(either policy ineffectiveness or a pattern of persistent
errors),theauthoritiesshouldbemoreaggressivethan
in the certainty case. In contrast, Williams, who uses a
large-scale, rational-expectations model, ﬁnds that
policy should be more cautious than in the certainty
case.
As expected, there is some evidence that simple rules
are more robust across models than more complicated
rules. Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999) and Taylor
(1999b) provide results that suggest that simple Tay-
lor-type rules perform quite well in various types of
models. Preliminary work done at the Bank of Canada
by Amano suggests that simple Taylor rules are more
robust to changes in economic behaviour than inﬂa-
tion-forecast-based rules. Nevertheless, as argued by
Christiano and Gust (1999) and Isard and Laxton
(1999), one needs to be cautious before drawing strong
conclusions concerning the robustness of a particular
rule, since until recently, the vast majority of studies
have used the same class of linear sticky-price models.
More evidence is required on the performance of rules
in other classes of models.
Conclusion
In the last few years, considerable work has been done
on policy rules. There has been signiﬁcant progress on
the conceptual representation of the problem faced by
central banks; that is, how best to keep inﬂation close
to its desired rate without creating excess variability
elsewhere in the economy. There has also been
progress in the theoretical understanding of how vari-
ous forms of uncertainty complicate the choice of opti-
mal policy. Advances in computer technology have
allowedresearcherstoundertakeextensivesimulation
analysis of macroeconomic models to evaluate the rel-
ative performance of various policy rules. Since the
optimal policy rule in one model is unlikely to per-
form well in another model, some attention has been
given to ﬁnding rules that will do reasonably well
across models. However, as noted by Freedman
(1999), a comparison of the beneﬁts of complex but
optimal rules, on the one hand, and simple but robust
rules, on the other hand, remains an important subject
for future research.53 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 1999–2000
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